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TAKING A BIT OUT OF CRIME: 
BITCOIN AND CROSS-BORDER TAX 
EVASION 
INTRODUCTION 
n 2009, a Norwegian man spent roughly 150 kroner to pur-
chase 5,000 bitcoins.1 He promptly forgot about the in-
vestment, which amounted to around US$27.2 Four years later, 
he rediscovered his bitcoins, which were then worth over eight 
hundred thousand dollars.3 Indeed, the value of a bitcoin, 
which has proven wildly volatile in the years since Satoshi 
Nakamoto created the program, increased nearly five thousand 
percent in less than a year.4 From its inception in 2009 to April 
2010, the value of one bitcoin never topped US$0.14.5 On Feb-
ruary 10, 2011, one bitcoin reached parity with the U.S. dollar 
for the first time.6 Following press coverage, including in 
Forbes magazine and the popular gossip site Gawker,7 a 
                                                                                                                                     
 1. Samuel Gibbs, Man Buys $27 of Bitcoin, Forgets about Them, Finds 
They’re Now Worth $886k, GUARDIAN (Oct. 29, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/oct/29/bitcoin-forgotten-
currency-norway-oslo-home. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Robert W. Wood, Bitcoin’s $13.50 To $1,200 Eleven Month Climb—Now 
Taxes, FORBES (Dec. 2, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2013/12/02/bitcoins-13-50-to-1200-
eleven-month-climb-now-taxes/; see also Derek A. Dion, I’ll Gladly Trade You 
Two Bits on Tuesday for a Byte Today: Bitcoin, Regulating Fraud in the E-
Conomy of Hacker-Cash, U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y (Spring 2013); Benjamin 
Wallace, The Rise and Fall of Bitcoin, WIRED MAG. (Dec. 2011), available at 
http://www.wired.com/magazine/2011/11/mf_bitcoin/all/1. 
 5. Wallace, supra note 4. 
 6. IamTheRealMike, Online-Only Currency BitCoin Reaches Dollar Pari-
ty, SLASHDOT (Feb. 10, 2011, 1:59 PM), 
http://news.slashdot.org/story/11/02/10/189246/online-only-currency-bitcoin-
reaches-dollar-parity. 
 7. Andy Greenberg, Crypto Currency, FORBES (Apr. 20, 2011, 6:00 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2011/0509/technology-psilocybin-bitcoins-gavin-
andresen-crypto-currency.html; Adrian Chen, The Underground Website 
Where You Can Buy Any Drug Imaginable, GAWKER (June 1, 2011, 1:14 PM), 
I
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bitcoin’s value skyrocketed and ultimately reached over 
US$1200 in late 2013.8 However, each time the value of the 
currency has increased it has crashed amid a spate of Ponzi 
schemes,9 attacks by hackers,10 and criticism from elected offi-
cials, including U.S. Senators Chuck Schumer and Joe 
Manchin.11 The value of the bitcoin has continued to fluctuate 
significantly, but sat at over US$800 as of December 31, 2013.12 
                                                                                                                                     
http://gawker.com/5805928/the-underground-website-where-you-can-buy-any-
drug-imaginable. 
 8. Charles Arthur, Bitcoin Value Crashes below Cost of Production as 
Broader Use Stutters, GUARDIAN (Oct. 18, 2011, 12:27 PM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/oct/18/bitcoin-value-crash-
cryptocurrency. 
 9. Adrianne Jeffries, Suspected Multi-million Dollar Bitcoin Pyramid 
Scheme Shuts Down, Investors Revolt, VERGE (Aug. 27, 2012, 3:43 PM), 
http://www.theverge.com/2012/8/27/3271637/bitcoin-savings-trust-pyramid-
scheme-shuts-down. 
 10. James Ball, Bitcoins: What Are They and How Do They Work?, 
GUARDIAN (June 22, 2011, 9:07 AM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/jun/22/bitcoins-how-do-they-
work. 
 11. Brennon Slattery, U.S. Senators Want to Shut Down Bitcoins, Curren-
cy of Internet Drug Trade, PCWORLD (June 10, 2011, 1:58 PM), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/230084/us_senators_want_to_shut_down_bitc
oins_currency_of_internet_drug_trade.html. 
 12. For a comprehensive chart marking the history of the price of a bitcoin 
on various exchanges, see BITCOINCHARTS.COM, 
http://bitcoincharts.com/charts/mtgoxUSD#rg120ztgSzm1g10zm2g25zv (last 
visited Dec. 31, 2013); see also Rob Wile, The Chinese Are in Love with Bitcoin 
and It’s Driving the Digital Currency’s Prices into the Stratosphere, 
BUSINESSINSIDER (Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/china-and-
bitcoin-2013-10#ixzz2jPvA0QS4 (“Since reaching a low of $109 on the Mt. 
Gox exchange the day of Silk Road incident Oct. 2, prices have climbed nearly 
$100, reaching as much as $233. Prices haven’t fallen below $200 since Sun-
day [Oct. 24, 2013].”); Christopher Williams, Bitcoin Tumbles on Closure of 
Drugs Black Market the Silk Road, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 3, 2013), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/currency/10352176/Bitcoin-tumbles-on-
closure-of-drugs-black-market-the-Silk-Road.html (tracking the fluctuations 
after the Silk Road closure from $140 to $110 and back up to $128 per bitcoin 
on October 2, 2013). For up-to-date exchange rates, see MTGOX—BITCOIN 
EXCHANGE, http://www.mtgox.com (last visited Feb. 18, 2014). 
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While investors are likely ecstatic at its meteoric rise in value, 
regulators and taxpayers alike face uncertainty regarding 
Bitcoin’s status for tax purposes. 
This Note asserts two arguments. First, that Bitcoin fits 
within the Internal Revenue Service’s existing legal frame-
work. And second, that the serious and justified concerns about 
tax evasion by those who use Bitcoin instead of more tradition-
al methods of online payment can be counterbalanced by ex-
panding self-reporting requirements for the cryptocurrency and 
increasing cooperative information sharing via a multilateral 
tax agreement. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Bitcoin is a peer-to-peer electronic cryptocurrency13 that op-
erates on open-source14 software.15 In most traditional online 
transactions, financial institutions that are trusted by the par-
ties involved in the exchange act as a third-party verifier.16 
Bitcoin was designed to avoid the need for such institutions 
and eliminate the associated transaction costs.17 Designed by 
the pseudonymous programmer Satoshi Nakamoto,18 Bitcoin 
                                                                                                                                     
 13. A cryptocurrency is loosely defined as a decentralized system of ex-
change, or electronic money, which uses cryptography to provide the pro-
gram’s security. There are numerous alternative cryptocurrencies which are, 
for the purposes of this Note, functionally equivalent. 
 14. Open-source software is computer software that has publicly available 
code and a license granted by the copyright holder that allows anyone to 
view, alter, and distribute the software. For a complete definition, see The 
Open Source Definition, OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE, http://opensource.org/osd 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2014). 
 15. Thomas Lowenthal, Bitcoin: Inside the Encrypted, Peer-to-Peer Digital 
Currency, ARS TECHNICA (June 8, 2011), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2011/06/bitcoin-inside-the-encrypted-peer-to-peer-currency/. 
 16. SATOSHI NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC CASH 
SYSTEM (2009), http://www.bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Nakamoto posted online about Bitcoin extensively in its early stages, 
but subsequently disappeared (at least under that name). His writing style, 
syntax, and frequency have been analyzed to a considerable degree, and ex-
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allows for peer-to-peer payments without a central authority or 
financial institution acting as an intermediary.19 Unlike other 
electronic or in-game currencies, Bitcoin is not pegged to a gov-
ernment-backed fiat dollar,20 meaning its value relative to 
those currencies is market driven. Like cash, the Bitcoin net-
work lacks identifying information such as e-mail addresses 
and user names, so the balance in an account simply “belongs” 
to the individual who has the file and can trade in bitcoin.21 
Each Bitcoin account has a balance in bitcoins and an “ad-
dress”22 to which bitcoins can be sent via the client,23 but the 
                                                                                                                                     
perts in cryptography and the Bitcoin community tend to believe there is a 
small pool of individuals who could have reasonably created the program. In 
March 2014, Newsweek magazine wrote a profile of a California man it al-
leged was the publisher of the Bitcoin paper. Leah McGrath Goodman, The 
Face Behind Bitcoin, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 6, 2014, 
http://mag.newsweek.com/2014/03/14/bitcoin-satoshi-
nakamoto.html?_ga=1.31968382.1302259160.1393422837. For a deeper anal-
ysis of his potential identity, see Joshua Davis, The Crypto-Currency, NEW 
YORKER, Oct. 10, 2011, at 62, 68, available at 
http://cryptome.org/0005/bitcoin-who.pdf (discussing the necessary prowess 
and limited number of individuals capable of creating the code for Bitcoin); 
see also Wallace, supra note 4 (speculating that Bitcoin may be the work of a 
group of individuals, perhaps at the NSA or Google). 
 19. Wallace, supra note 4. 
 20. J.P. & G.T., Bits and Bob, ECONOMIST: BABBAGE (June 13, 2011, 8:30 
PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2011/06/virtual-currency 
[hereinafter Bits and Bob]. 
 21. Introduction: Anonymity, BITCOIN.IT WIKI, 
https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Introduction#Anonymity (last updated Jan. 20, 2014) 
[hereinafter Anonymity]. 
 22. Addresses are not technically random, but appear to be. For example, 
the author has used the address 
“16wBhFQckvRAzWCybmCkCSeNkXsLiXbU2w” while researching this arti-
cle. 
 23. Unsurprisingly, there is no official usage rule for describing the coin, 
but the Bitcoin community tends to describe the network, client, and other 
software as “Bitcoin,” while a unit of currency is stylized with the lowercase 
“bitcoin.” Some discussion on the subject can be found at Convention—To 
BTC or Not to btc, That Is the Question, BITCOIN FORUM, 
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“[t]ransacting parties do not need to know each other’s identity 
in the same way that a store owner does not know a customer’s 
name who pays with cash.”24 In other words, whether a pur-
chaser wishes to buy online from a worldwide brand’s website, 
in person at a local grocery store, or from a yard sale vendor, 
the transaction is the same: a direct exchange of digital coins 
over the Internet for the goods or services provided. The result 
is a secure, partially anonymous, and decentralized electronic 
medium of exchange with limited transaction fees.25 
Bitcoin has caused quite a sensation since its creation in 
2009.26 It has been discussed in Congressional hearings,27 ac-
cepted as donations by a New Hampshire state senator28 and 
                                                                                                                                     
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=108775.0;all (last visited Feb. 19, 
2014). 
 24. Anonymity, supra note 21. 
 25. A spirited discussion of transaction fees and their role in the Bitcoin 
economy once the mining process yields smaller results can be found at 
Where Do Transaction Fees Go?, BITCOIN FORUM, 
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=34865.0. 
 26. Annie Lowery, My Money Is Cooler Than Yours, SLATE (May 18, 2011, 
6:07 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2011/05/my_money_is_coole
r_than_yours.html (highlighting the “criminals, libertarians, and privacy 
freaks” who have embraced the system, as well as its appeal to those parties). 
 27. Bitcoin was first mentioned in a Congressional hearing during the tes-
timony of Lawrence H. White, Professor of Economics at the Mercatus Center 
at George Mason University, in the context of removing legal tender status 
from U.S. dollars to allow payment in, among other options including gold 
and foreign currency, “[b]itcoins, and whatever else a lender and a borrower 
might agree upon.” Professor White testified before the House Committee on 
Financial Services Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary Policy and Technol-
ogy in September, 2011. Road Map to Sound Money: A Legislative Hearing on 
H.R. 1098 and Restoring the Dollar Before the Fin. Servs. Subcomm. on Do-
mestic Monetary Policy and Tech. and the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th  Cong. 
87–90 (2011) (statement of Lawrence H. White, Professor of Econ., George 
Mason Univ.), available at 
http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/091311white.pdf. 
 28. Donate Bitcoins to the Campaign, MARKWARDEN.COM, 
http://www.markwarden.com/page/bitcoin-donation (last visited Oct. 11, 
2012). The campaign accepts bitcoins and “support[s] currency freedom,” but 
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by the Internet’s most popular blogging system,29 commented 
on by a Nobel Prize-winning economist,30 and denounced by 
U.S. senators.31 It has been called “a compelling, if not polariz-
ing mix of freedom of speech, cryptography, networked compu-
ting, finance, economics, and even politics.”32 Importantly, 
Bitcoin has gained traction worldwide, benefitting from mone-
tary insecurity in Europe,33 and has been evaluated by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation.34 It is now reportedly accepted 
by over one thousand businesses in a total of ninety-eight coun-
                                                                                                                                     
in “the spirit of transparency and legality . . . require[s] the contributor’s 
name and home post office address with every donation” as well as other in-
formation to comply with state and federal campaign finance laws. 
 29. Wordpress.com, the most popular site for self-publishing a blog, began 
accepting payment via bitcoin in 2012. Andy Skelton, Pay Another Way: 
Bitcoin, WORDPRESS.COM, http://en.blog.wordpress.com/2012/11/15/pay-
another-way-bitcoin/ (Nov. 15, 2012, 10:21 PM). 
 30. Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Golden Cyberfetters, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2011, 
12:20 AM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/07/golden-
cyberfetters/; see also Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Bitcoin Is Evil, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 28, 2013, 2:35 PM). In 2008, Krugman won the Sveriges Riksbank Prize 
in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel “for his analysis of trade 
patterns and location of economic activity.” Paul Krugman—Facts, 
NOBELPRIZE.ORG, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-
sciences/laureates/2008/krugman-facts.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2013). 
 31. Tom Cheredar, Forget Piracy, U.S. Government Is Going After Bitcoin, 
VENTUREBEAT (June 8, 2011, 9:58 PM), 
http://venturebeat.com/2011/06/08/government-crackdown-on-bitcoin (“Sena-
tors Charles Schumer and Joe Manchin are pressing officials to take action 
against Bitcoin.”). 
 32. Alec Lui, With Euro Instability, Can Bitcoin Now Compete with Hard 
Currency?, MOTHERBOARD (June 12, 2012), 
http://motherboard.vice.com/2012/6/12/with-euro-instability-can-bitcoin-now-
compete-with-hard-currency. 
 33. Adrianne Jeffries, Bitcoin Gets a Boost from Euro Crisis, BETABEAT 
(June 11, 2012, 8:51 AM), http://betabeat.com/2012/06/bitcoin-gets-a-boost-
from-euro-crisis. 
 34. CYBER INTELLIGENCE SECTION & CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE SECTION, FED. 
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, BITCOIN VIRTUAL CURRENCY: UNIQUE FEATURES 
PRESENT DISTINCT CHALLENGES FOR DETERRING ILLICIT ACTIVITY (2012), 
http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2012/05/Bitcoin-FBI.pdf.) 
[hereinafter FBI REPORT]. 
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tries via Bitcoin payment service provider, Bitpay.35 Exemplify-
ing the currency’s international scope, the second Bitcoin-
related lawsuit36 was filed in San Francisco, California in 2012 
by plaintiffs who listed sixty unknown defendants,37 in addition 
to the named defendant company, which was registered as a 
financial services provider in New Zealand 38 with a Singapore-
based founder.39 
A. How Bitcoin Works 
To facilitate secure transactions without a central issuing au-
thority or third-party financial institution, Bitcoin relies on 
cryptographic proof via “hashing” and “forced work,” essentially 
amounting to using math to prove the veracity of the transac-
tions.40 Bitcoin avoids fraudulent transactions and “double-
spending,” which are normally verified by a banking institu-
tion, by maintaining a public record of every transaction in the 
                                                                                                                                     
 35. BitPay Exceeds 1,000 Merchants Accepting Bitcoin, BITPAY (Sept. 11, 
2012), http://blog.bitpay.com/2012/09/bitpay-exceeds-1000-merchants-
accepting.html. 
 36. The first suit involving Bitcoin transactions was also filed in California 
in August, 2012. In that case, hackers allegedly took over 46,000 BTC 
(bitcoin) from an exchange company, though some victims speculate that the 
theft was an inside job. As in the second case, the first involves multiple in-
ternational and unidentified individuals and corporations. See Morgen Peck, 
First Bitcoin Suit Filed in San Francisco, IEEE SPECTRUM (Aug. 15, 2012), 
http://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/computing/networks/first-bitcoin-lawsuit-
filed-in-san-francisco. 
 37. Megan Geuss, Bitcoinica Users Sue for $460k in Lost Bitcoins, 
ARSTECHNICA (Aug. 11, 2012, 8:10 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2012/08/bitcoinica-users-sue-for-460k-in-lost-bitcoins/. 
 38. Jon Matonis, Bitcoinica Registers in New Zealand for Bitcoin Margin 
Trading, FORBES (Apr. 21, 2012), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jonmatonis/2012/04/21/bitcoinica-registers-in-
new-zealand-for-bitcoin-margin-trading. 
 39. For an interview with the founder, explaining his involvement with the 
company, see 10 Questions with Zhou Tong (The Creator of Bitcoinica), 
COINABUL BLOG, http://coinabul.tumblr.com/post/24022841613/10qs-zhou-
tong-bitcoinica/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2013). 
 40. NAKAMOTO, supra note 16; Bits and Bob, supra note 20. 
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currency. However, in a large network with many transactions 
that require verification, calling for all users to scrutinize the 
public list of transactions for accuracy is impractical.41 To allow 
for verification of the transaction record in essentially real 
time, without nefarious individuals tampering with the pro-
cess, “[i]ndividual transactions are encrypted, logged by a de-
centralized network running on thousands of home computers, 
and recorded in a public ledger,” thus creating a “distributed 
middleman.”42 
Nakamoto’s system of user-generated transaction verification 
does two significant things that previous attempts at decentral-
ized online currencies could not. First, by providing for the ver-
ification of previous transactions on the network via “computa-
tional proof of the chronological order of transactions,” it pre-
vents users from spending the same Bitcoin twice.43 Second, it 
offers a solution to the problem of determining which chain of 
code is the most trustworthy by giving weight to the amount of 
computing power invested in mining, not the number of users 
on the network.44 
                                                                                                                                     
 41. Bits and Bob, supra note 20. 
 42. Barrett Sheridan, Bitcoin: Currency of the Geeks, BUSINESSWEEK MAG. 
(June 16, 2011), 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/11_26/b4234041554873.htm. 
 43. NAKAMOTO, supra note 16, at 1. In his self-published 2009 white paper 
introducing Bitcoin, Nakamoto claims that “transactions that are computa-
tionally impractical to reverse” and “generate computational proof of the 
chronological order of transactions” prevent double-spending, since any at-
tempt to spend the same coin twice from the same account will be rejected as 
part of the “proof of work” verification needed to generate new coins. “The 
system is secure as long as honest nodes collectively control more [Central 
Processing Unit (“CPU”)] power than any cooperating group of attacker 
nodes.” Id. 
 44. Id. Here, the trustworthiness of the chain refers to verifying the accu-
racy of the public record of past transactions. In other words, the system of 
verification acts as a mechanism for making sure that the history of Bitcoin 
transactions is accurate. While an attacker in control of more than half of the 
network can reverse his or her own transactions—possibly allowing for dou-
ble spending—and prevent others from mining new bitcoins, an attacker 
cannot reverse other individuals’ transactions, send coins that he or she does 
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To gain possession of new bitcoins, users have three options. 
Individuals can either convert their local currency to bitcoins 
via an exchange,45 or accept the currency as payment for goods 
or services.46 Alternatively, individuals can “mine” bitcoins by 
offering their computer’s processing powers to validate transac-
tions in the public ledger.47 The mining process is the method 
by which the Bitcoin network enters new coins into circulation 
while simultaneously verifying the history of Bitcoin transac-
tions.48 Verification requires a process termed “forced work” or 
“proof of work.”49 Each miner’s computing power is put to use 
by the network to solve a complex algorithm, called a “hash.”50 
This algorithm creates a number called a hash value, or a di-
                                                                                                                                     
not possess, create new coins without mining, or stop others from doing busi-
ness altogether. Weaknesses: Attacker Has a Lot of Computing Power, 
BITCOIN.IT WIKI, 
https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Weaknesses#Attacker_has_a_lot_of_computing 
_power (last visited Oct. 4, 2013). In short, a successful attack can do signifi-
cant damage to the network, but even an individual or group of individuals 
with control of the network are likely to find it more cost-effective to follow 
the network’s rules. While Bitcoin’s design is such that an attack on the net-
work is not likely to be profitable for the attacker due to the enormous cost of 
maintaining more than half of the computing power of the peer-to-peer net-
work, it is still possible. Such an attack could cause irreparable damage to 
Bitcoin since the verification of transactions during the time the attacker 
controlled the system would be extremely difficult. For an example of an at-
tempted attack based on modifying the open-source code used to create the 
Bitcoin program, see Davis, supra note 18. 
 45. See for example the most popular Bitcoin exchange, MTGOX, 
https://mtgox.com (last visited Feb. 22, 2014). 
 46. For a non-comprehensive list of companies accepting payments in 
bitcoin see Trade, BITCOIN.IT WIKI, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Trade (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2014). 
 47. How Does Bitcoin Work?, BITCOIN.ORG, http://bitcoin.org/en/how-it-
works (last visited Dec. 30, 2013). 
 48. Id. 
 49. NAKAMOTO, supra note 16, at 3. 
 50. Hash, BITCOIN.IT WIKI, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Hash (last visited Feb. 
22, 2014) (“A hash algorithm turns an arbitrarily-large amount of data into a 
fixed-length hash. The same hash will always result from the same data, but 
modifying the data by even one bit will completely change the hash.”). 
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gest, which “provides a unique representation of the original” 
message.51 It is not possible to decrypt the hash value alone to 
decipher the original message, and changes made to the origi-
nal message give no indication as to what a new digest will look 
like.52 In short, the answer, or digest, “appears to be generated 
at random” to a user who sees it, but no matter how difficult 
the algorithm is, once it is solved, the other users can quickly 
verify the answer by running the hashing algorithm with the 
proposed solution.53 The history of every Bitcoin transaction is 
kept on that chain, which is publicly available and corroborated 
through the hashing process. A reward is granted to the miner 
whose “proof of work” solved the last “block” of the algorithm, 
and that reward is the first transaction in the next block, which 
in practical terms means that the rewarded miner now has 
more bitcoins in his account or “wallet.”54 Like any other com-
puter file, the new coins can be stored on a local computer, 
backed up on a hard drive, or stored on an online wallet ser-
vice.55 Like cash, if a bitcoin file is destroyed, stolen, or other-
wise compromised, there is no way to recover it.56 
Currently, miners earn twenty-five bitcoins57 as every new 
block is created; however, the open source Bitcoin program is 
set to decrease that amount with every 210,000 blocks creat-
ed.58 This means that the total number of bitcoins in circulation 
                                                                                                                                     
 51. Bits and Bob, supra note 20. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Sheridan, supra note 42. 
 57. Adrianne Jeffries, Total Number of Bitcoins Hits 10.5 Million, Produc-
tion Halves to Stop Inflation, VERGE (Nov. 28, 2012, 10:44 AM), 
http://www.theverge.com/2012/11/28/3701434/total-number-of-bitcoins-hits-
10-5-million-production-halves-to-stop (As a safeguard against inflation, “the 
‘block reward,’ the number of Bitcoins that can be created at a time, [] has 
dropped from 50 to 25.”). 
 58. Jon Matonis, ECB: “Roots of Bitcoin Can Be Found in the Austrian 
School of Economics,” FORBES BLOG (Nov. 3, 2012, 11:04 AM), 
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will approach, but never reach, twenty-one million.59 To com-
plicate matters, in order to maintain a relatively steady pace of 
authentication, the Bitcoin software changes the difficulty level 
of the algorithm based on the number of users trying to solve it. 
To oversimplify slightly, this means that if more computers 
mine on the Bitcoin client—and more powerful computers at 
that—the odds of the average miner getting the reward de-
crease.60 
In response, mining “pools,” in which groups of users collec-
tively mine and earn a small percentage of the bitcoin reward, 
have become increasingly popular.61 Since greater processing 
power increases the odds of finding the new coins, users can 
join a team of fellow miners in lending their computing power 
to the process.62 The team works together to solve bits of the 
algorithm, and the members of the pool are paid the reward 
amount in bitcoins.63 Each member of the pool is given a per-
centage of those coins—often less a fee taken by the pool’s 
manager—usually based on the percentage of the pool’s pro-
                                                                                                                                     
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jonmatonis/2012/11/03/ecb-roots-of-bitcoin-can-
be-found-in-the-austrian-school-of-economics [hereinafter Matonis, ECB]. 
 59. Id. 
 60. As one pool puts it, “If you set out mining on your own, it may be a long 
time before you can make a return . . . If you have a slower computer, or a 
CPU miner, then pooled mining may be the only way that you will ever mine 
any bitcoins at all.” See BITCOIN.CZ MINING, http://mining.bitcoin.cz (last vis-
ited Nov. 2, 2013). 
 61. Bitcoin.cz describes the process: 
Our server gives users blocks of very low difficulty to solve. Each so-
lution found is registered as one “share.” Occasionally, a solution will 
happen to also meet the full-strength difficulty requirements of the 
Bitcoin network, resulting in a successful 25 BTC minting. This 25 
BTC is divided among all of the users that contributed to that round, 
weighted by the number of shares that they earned. 
See id. 
 62. Pooled Mining, BITOIN.IT WIKI, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Pooled_mining 
(last visited Jan. 19, 2013). 
 63. Id. 
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cessing power he or she provided to the group.64 This method 
provides a smaller but more consistent stream of income to the 
members of the pool, and allows those without major compu-
ting power to have a more reasonable chance at earning coins. 
However, determining where the miners are located and 
where payment from the pool’s organizer came from can be dif-
ficult. Miners contribute their computing power from all over 
the world, and mining pool organizers operate with nearly the 
same anonymity as the rest of the Bitcoin network. Therefore, 
a user may know the country of origin of his or her pool’s man-
ager,65 but may have little other verifiable data about the per-
son or persons administering the pool despite receiving steady 
payment in bitcoins for his or her mining efforts. While the pool 
arrangement somewhat resembles an employer-employee rela-
tionship, the association is extremely informal. The individual 
miners have no obligation to continue to mine and any time 
they are not mining, they are unable to receive a piece of the 
reward.66 
The dispersal of the authentication method over numerous 
individuals on the network allows for one of the most novel and 
important Bitcoin innovations, the elimination of the third-
party verifier.67 The advent of the Internet and subsequent ex-
plosion of e-commerce created a demand for methods of secure 
electronic payment. PayPal, the most popular online payment 
system, allows its users to pay for goods and services by acting 
                                                                                                                                     
 64. There are currently numerous ways to divide the earned coins among 
pool members. For a comparison of pools, see Comparison of Mining Pools, 
BITOIN.IT WIKI, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Comparison_of_mining_pools (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2014). 
 65. Id. 
 66. BITCOIN.CZ, supra note 60. This is known as Slush’s Pool. Bitcoin.cz 
notes that the Bitcoin system does not allow for any other kind of arrange-
ment: “When the pool mine [sic] a block, only users who worked on that block 
are rewarded, and only for work they did on that block. This is an unavoida-
ble consequence of the way that Bitcoin mining in general works.” Id. 
 67. NAKAMOTO, supra note 16, at 1. 
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as a third-party verifier.68 Users “fund their PayPal accounts 
through existing debit cards, credit cards or checking ac-
counts,”69 allowing individuals and businesses to transact 
“without mailing a check or sending a credit card number to an 
unknown person or Web site.”70 Thus, users do business with 
one another while only disclosing detailed personal and finan-
cial information to PayPal.71 Bitcoin endeavors to remove the 
need for a third party to verify the transaction, as the client’s 
users verify the transaction chain via the aforementioned hash-
ing process.72 Since the program automatically reduces the re-
ward for mining new bitcoins and maintains a steady average 
rate of distribution, bitcoin is not subject to the politically-
influenced policies of central banks, which are prone to infla-
tionary practices.73 
B. The Controversies 
The controversial nature of Bitcoin is without question. It’s 
efficacy as a medium of trade, a store of value, and a method of 
increasing privacy with respect to online purchases are hotly 
                                                                                                                                     
 68. About PayPal, PAYPAL, https://www.paypal-media.com/about (last vis-
ited Jan. 18, 2013). 
 69. PayPal, Discover Team Up on Mobile Payments, WALL ST. J. TECH. 
BLOG (Aug. 22, 2012, 6:41 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444358404577605072602107
932.html. 
 70. Lee S. Adams & David J. Martz, Developments in Cyberbanking, 57 
BUS. LAW. 1257, 1272 (2002). 
 71. Carl Kaminski, Online Peer-to-Peer Payments: Paypal Primes the 
Pump, Will Banks Follow?, 7 N.C. BANKING INST. 375, 379 (2003). 
 72. The Internet also led to the creation of other digital currencies, which 
were often backed by precious metals or cash reserves, and sometimes had 
hard currency counterparts. See generally Peter C. Tucker, The Digital Cur-
rency Doppelganger: Regulatory Challenge or Harbinger of the New Econo-
my?, 17 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 589 (2009). 
 73. Jon Matonis, Fear Not Deflation, FORBES BLOG (Dec. 23, 2013, 12:01 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jonmatonis/2012/12/23/fear-not-deflation/. 
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contested.74 A number of problems face those promoting the use 
of Bitcoin. First, Bitcoin itself could potentially violate U.S. 
law, as it arguably competes with the U.S. dollar and other na-
tional currencies that have a monopoly on the issuing of mon-
ey.75 More likely, Bitcoin is not directly competitive with the 
U.S. dollar within the meaning of the relevant statutes.76 
Bitcoin was also the currency of choice on Silk Road, an online 
black marketplace for illegal drugs, weapons, and child pornog-
raphy.77 It has been scrutinized and to some degree stigmatized 
by the FBI and elected officials due to this association.78 It has 
been similarly targeted for its potential as a money laundering 
vehicle.79 
Still, Bitcoin appeals to its supporters for a variety of rea-
sons. Most economists promote the positive role of central 
banking on modern economies—including maintaining price 
stability, preserving high employment levels, and avoiding de-
flation.80 However, to some individuals, centralized monetary 
authorities, “diminishing financial privacy, and the entrenched 
legacy financial infrastructure” spur innovation to escape “eco-
                                                                                                                                     
 74. For a skeptics take on the practical value of Bitcoin, see Krugman, 
supra note 30. 
 75. For a full treatment of this subject, see Reuben Grinberg, Bitcoin: An 
Innovative Alternative Digital Currency, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 160, 
182 (2011) Grinberg notes that “[j]udicial interpretations of the Act and its 
precursors indicate that the touchstone of the Act is competition with official 
currency,” and also characterizing a government crackdown on a private 
minter as “best understood as an attack on counterfeiting and fraud rather 
than as the first salvo in a war against private currencies.” Id. 
 76. Id.; see also Dion, supra note 4 (evaluating counterfeiting laws, the 
Securities and Exchange Acts, and disclosure requirements for financial in-
stitutions, and concluding that Bitcoin is problematic from a regulatory 
standpoint, but not due to counterfeiting concerns). 
 77. Sheridan, supra note 42. 
 78. FBI REPORT, supra note 34; Sheridan, supra note 42. 
 79. Bits and Bob, supra note 20. 
 80. Monetary Policy and the Economy, in THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: 
PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 15, 15–16, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_2.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2014). 
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nomic repression.”81 These individuals prefer commodity-
backed or competing currencies and do not trust the long-term 
value of fiat money, such as the U.S. dollar, which, like 
bitcoins, cannot be redeemed for a commodity.82 They prefer to 
store their wealth, and when possible, transact business, out-
side the monopolistic issuance of currency by central banks.83 
As Bitcoin is unsupported by any government or central au-
thority, it is not subject to the political pressures or economic 
policies that govern central banking authorities and private 
money issuers.84 However, the lack of consolidated control also 
makes Bitcoin appealing to those wishing to engage in illegal 
activity or support dissident organizations, such as Wik-
iLeaks.85 Bitcoin has the additional advantage of being usable 
                                                                                                                                     
 81. Jon Matonis, Bitcoin Prevents Monetary Tyranny, FORBES BLOG (Oct. 4, 
2012, 11:58 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jonmatonis/2012/10/04/bitcoin-
prevents-monetary-tyranny. 
 82. See VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES, EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK (2012), 
available at 
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemes201210en.pdf, 22 
[hereinafter VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES]. 
One of the foremost names in this field is Friedrich A. Hayek. He 
wrote some very influential publications, such as Denationalisation 
of Money (1976), in which he posits that governments should not 
have a monopoly over the issuance of money. He instead suggests 
that private banks should be allowed to issue non-interest-bearing 
certificates based on their own registered trademarks. These certifi-
cates (i.e. currencies) should be open to competition and would be 
traded at variable exchange rates. Any currencies able to guarantee 
a stable purchasing power would eliminate other less stable curren-
cies from the market. The result of this process of competition and 
profit maximisation would be a highly efficient monetary system 
where only stable currencies would coexist. 
Id. 
 83. Matonis, ECB, supra note 58. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Jon Matonis, WikiLeaks Bypasses Financial Blockade with Bitcoin, 
FORBES BLOG (Aug. 20, 2012, 9:47AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jonmatonis/2012/08/20/wikileaks-bypasses-
financial-blockade-with-bitcoin/. 
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across borders and without the limitations that come from the 
extensive authorization process required for the use of credit 
cards.86 Thus, the lack of a third-party verifier, cash-like ano-
nymity, and worldwide application of Bitcoin opens up a much 
larger portion of e-commerce to illegal and illicit activity, as 
well as tax evasion. 
Although its primary goal is arguably “preventing monetary 
tyranny” by avoiding the whims of centralized banking 
schemes,87 some advocates of Bitcoin recognize the need to 
standardize its use and protect its security in order to popular-
ize the currency and prove its legitimacy.88 Bitcoin offers no 
official dispute resolution authority,89 leaving it up to users to 
trust that their transactions are kept secure by the program’s 
self-regulating procedures. User accounts are not tied to ordi-
nary bank accounts or other personal identifying information, 
making protecting ones’ property rights in the recent explosion 
of Ponzi schemes and defrauded investor cases more difficult 
                                                                                                                                     
 86. Bits and Bob, supra note 20; see also Banking Blockade, WIKILEAKS 
(Oct. 24, 2011), http://wikileaks.org/Banking-Blockade.html (detailing the 
“Banking Blockade” by banking institutions, which declined to accept dona-
tions to WikiLeaks as a result of political pressure from the United States 
government). 
 87. Matonis, supra note 81. 
 88. The Bitcoin Foundation, whose Board of Directors includes prominent 
Bitcoin supporters, was founded in October 2012 to promote these goals. See 
Jon Matonis, Bitcoin Foundation Launches to Drive Bitcoin’s Advancement, 
FORBES BLOG (Sept. 27, 2012), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jonmatonis/2012/09/27/bitcoin-foundation-
launches-to-drive-bitcoins-advancement. 
The Bitcoin Foundation mission leads to the early specific goals of 
financially sponsoring the efforts of the core development team, 
funding core infrastructure such as a test network and a DNS seed 
node, publishing a set of best practices for bitcoin integration, [and] 
coordinating responses to business and media inquiries. 
Id. 
 89. In response, some escrow-like services that charge a flat percentage 
fee, such as BTCrow.com, have emerged. Of course, an escrow service that is 
untrustworthy could abscond with bitcoins just as easily as a buyer or seller. 
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than conventional financial transaction cases of fraud.90 The 
root of the Bitcoin scheme is that confidence in the currency 
stems from its self-regulatory properties, without requiring the 
control of any one authority. However, users who are hacked or 
stolen from, or who have disputes stemming from transactions 
in bitcoin, are increasingly turning to traditional legal authori-
ties for a remedy.91 If legal remedies, such as arbitration, are 
needed regularly, it may defeat the Bitcoin proposition alto-
gether, as the advantages Nakamoto envisioned—including 
lower cost-of-use than credit cards and a secure network—may 
not be realized. Proponents counter that while Bitcoin ex-
changes and users have both been subject to significant securi-
ty breaches, the network infrastructure has not been subject to 
a successful attack. In fact, experts in cryptography and pro-
gramming have been unable to find significant breaches in the 
network.92 Even though these breaches have not compromised 
the infrastructure of the Bitcoin network, they have created 
serious problems for those advocating the expansion of Bitcoin 
use into everyday purchasing.93 
                                                                                                                                     
 90. Willard Foxton, Bitcoin ‘Pirate’ Scandal: SEC Steps in amid Allega-
tions That the Whole Thing Was a Ponzi Scheme, TELEGRAPH (last updated 
Sept. 27, 2012), 
http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/technology/willardfoxton2/100007836/bitcoin-
pirate-scandal-sec-steps-in-amid-allegations-that-the-whole-thing-was-a-
ponzi-scheme. 
 91. See, e.g., Julia Dixon, List of Bitcoin Court Cases, Complaints, Regula-
tory Actions, Etc., DGC MAG. (Jan. 1, 2014), http://www.dgcmagazine.com/list-
of-bitcoin-court-cases-complaints-regulatory-actions-etc/. 
 92. Davis, supra note 18. Internet security researcher Dan Kaminsky, 
known for discovering and fixing a flaw in Internet programming by which a 
skilled hacker could overtake or shut down nearly any website, was unable to 
find a “penetration point” into the Bitcoin network. He subsequently de-
scribed the Bitcoin program as the work of a “paranoid, painstaking” coder 
with “world-class” programming skills who, if working alone, “is a genius.” Id. 
 93. Neil McAllister, Bitcoin Foundation Vows to Clean Up Currency’s Bad 
Rep, Register (Sept. 29, 2012), 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/09/29/bitcoin_foundation_launched. 
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II. FEDERAL INCOME TAX OBLIGATIONS RESULTING FROM 
BITCOIN EXCHANGES 
Before analyzing concerns over tax evasion with respect to 
Bitcoin, one must establish as a threshold issue that transac-
tions in bitcoin are taxable under U.S. law. The technological 
advances since the foundation of the Internal Revenue Code 
(the “Code”) and its initial interpretations by U.S. courts over a 
century ago were not contemplated by the statute’s drafters.94 
While the problem of how to tax “virtual currencies”—meaning 
in-game, online, or other electronic sources of potentially taxa-
ble income—has received significant analysis, the U.S. gov-
ernment has not adopted a comprehensive approach to solving 
the tax concerns presented by electronic currencies. To com-
pound the difficulties resulting from a lack of clear policy on 
the subject, Bitcoin is meaningfully different from the virtual 
currencies that have been discussed in the past; thus, the legal 
issues associated with Bitcoin are largely unprecedented. 
U.S. citizens and residents conducting business within the 
fifty states and District of Columbia should look to the Internal 
Revenue Code to determine the tax ramifications of buying, 
selling, or trading in bitcoins. Under Section 61 of the Code, 
“gross income means all income from whatever source de-
rived.”95 Among the examples of income enumerated in Section 
61 are “compensation for services,” “income derived from busi-
ness,” interest, rent, dividends, and royalties, but the Code ex-
plicitly notes that the list is not comprehensive.96 
                                                                                                                                     
 94. Steven Chung, Real Taxation of Virtual Commerce, 28 VA. TAX REV. 
733, 777 (2009) (noting that those “lawmakers did not have virtual worlds in 
mind when they wrote the tax laws”). 
 95. 26 U.S.C. § 61(a) (2006). 
 96. Both the House and Senate Committees responsible for drafting the 
language of Section 61 instructed that the word “income” in the Internal Rev-
enue Code (“Code”) was to be used in the same way as it is used in text of the 
Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution, but that “there is no hope . . . of 
finding an authoritative definition of ‘income’ in the legislative and public 
debates that preceded and accompanied the ratification of the Sixteenth 
Amendment.” MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR. & LAWRENCE A. ZELENAK, FEDERAL 
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After the implementation of the Revenue Act of 1913, the 
U.S. Supreme Court added some substance to the definition of 
“income” in a series of cases.97 In the most prominent of those 
cases, Eisner v. Macomber, the Court defined income “as the 
gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined.”98 
The case, involving the taxation of stock dividends, established 
that Congress cannot tax the appreciation in value of assets 
during the taxable year, since the gain has not yet been real-
ized.99 Between 1920 and 1955, the Court eroded much of the 
definition provided in the Macomber case.100 Then, in 1955, the 
Court decided CIR v. Glenshaw Glass Co. and dealt the mortal 
blow to the Macomber definition.101 The Supreme Court dimin-
ished the importance of the Macomber decision considerably, 
choosing instead to concentrate on the fact that the punitive 
damages were “undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly real-
ized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion.”102 
This three-part test—accession to wealth, realization, and 
complete dominion—for determining whether a gain is income 
for tax purposes is still in use.103 Thus, a “sweeping” definition 
                                                                                                                                     
INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS ¶ 3.01, 1 (2d ed. 2013) [hereinafter 
MCMAHON & ZELENAK]. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920). 
 99. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Story of Macomber: The Continuing Leg-
acy of Realization, in TAX STORIES: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT TEN LEADING 
FEDERAL INCOME TAX CASES 53, 54 (Paul L. Caron ed., 2003). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955). Glenshaw in-
volved an antitrust settlement in which the punitive damages awarded to 
Glenshaw Glass Co. were not reported as taxable income. Id. 
 102. Id. at 431. The Court went on to note that “[t]he mere fact that the 
payments were extracted from the wrongdoers as punishment for unlawful 
conduct cannot detract from their character as taxable income to the recipi-
ents.” Id. 
 103. The three-part test is known as the Haig-Simons definition of income. 
Joseph A. Pechman, Comprehensive Income Taxation: A Comment, 81 HARV. 
L. REV. 63, 64 (1967). (“Even a cursory examination of the literature discloses 
that the basic concept used or implied in discussions of comprehensive income 
taxation is the Haig-Simons definition.”). 
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of taxable income as “all gains except those specifically ex-
empted”104 emerges, although the Glenshaw Glass definition is 
“neither as broad nor as straightforward” as it appears.105 For 
example, Congress has elected not to tax certain “gains” that 
are unrealized but not specifically exempted, like appreciation 
and imputed income.106 
One cause for the lack of clarity could be that the Court in 
Glenshaw Glass was attempting to preserve the requirement of 
realization while encompassing the broad statutory scope of the 
Sixteenth Amendment.107 With that in mind, Bitcoin falls 
squarely within the other two requirements: accession to 
wealth and complete dominion. The receipt of bitcoins is an ac-
cession to wealth, whether the coins are classified as a curren-
cy, a commodity, or any other type of property. The value of 
bitcoins fluctuates based on market factors, but the current 
definition of income “bring[s] within its grasp all accessions, 
whether consumed or saved,” and regardless of their actual 
market value.108 The possessor of the bitcoins also has total 
dominion over them because there are no restrictions on the 
sale, trade, transfer, destruction, or any other disposition of the 
files. 
Thus, the second part of the Glenshaw Glass test, “realiza-
tion,” is an important aspect in determining tax liability when 
using bitcoins to buy, sell, or trade, as well as with respect to 
the mining process.109 Realization is loosely defined in the 
                                                                                                                                     
 104. Id. at 429–30. 
 105. Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, Defining Income, 11 FLA. TAX 
REV. 295, 300 (2011). 
 106. MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 96. 
 107. Abreu & Greenstein, supra note 105, at 305. 
 108. Id at 304. 
 109. To illustrate the importance of realization to the taxable status of 
Bitcoin, consider the Haig-Simons definition of income, the most commonly 
used formulation of income in economics. Under the Haig-Simons definition,  
“income” is the “algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in 
consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of property rights 
between the beginning and end of the period in question.” That equation is 
the Glenshaw Glass definition without the requirement of realization, and 
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American tax structure, but the central theory is that the in-
crease or decrease in value of an asset is insufficient to expose 
one to income tax obligations.110 Pursuant to Treasury Regula-
tion 1.1001, “the gain or loss realized from the conversion of 
property into cash, or from the exchange of property for other 
property differing materially either in kind or in extent, is 
treated as income or as loss sustained.”111 In other words, an 
exchange of property that is materially different in kind is re-
quired for a taxable event to occur. 
Requiring realization eliminates administrative problems,112 
although it allows an individual to reap the benefits of some 
unrealized gains. For example, if one buys a stock at ten dol-
lars per share, and the price of that stock increases to one hun-
dred dollars per share in six months, one may decide to behave 
quite differently than originally planned, perhaps taking a va-
cation or purchasing real estate without selling one’s shares.113 
Other parties, such as lending institutions and long-lost rela-
tives, may treat one differently as well.114 If, in another six 
months, the stock has plummeted back to ten dollars per share, 
                                                                                                                                     
thus provides an even broader scope of taxable income than Glenshaw Glass. 
If the tax code were based on the Haig-Simons definition, all of a taxpayer’s 
property would have to be valued periodically. The difference in value during 
the taxable period would constitute the taxpayer’s income. See Abreu & 
Greenstein, supra note 105, at 304. 
 110. Kornhauser, supra note 99, at 55. 
 111. 26 C.F.R. § 1.1001–1 
 112. There are two major motives for requiring the tax system to wait until 
realization occurs before taxation. First, many assets that could appreciate or 
depreciate in value are so infrequently bought or sold that it is difficult to 
establish a fair market value for them without soliciting the purchase of the 
item from an actual buyer. Second is the problem of liquidity. Even if the 
value of an asset can be easily determined, the taxpayer may be unable to 
pay the tax without first selling the asset in question, thus discouraging long-
term capital investment. Potential investors may choose not to purchase an 
asset if they fear that “paper gains”—increases in the value of the asset that 
still run the risk of depreciating and also do not provide any liquid income—
are taxed before realization. See Abreu & Greenstein, supra note 105, at 300. 
 113. Kornhauser, supra note 99, at 55. 
 114. Id. 
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then from an economic perspective one has had both a gain of 
ninety dollars per share and a loss of the same value over the 
course of a year—however, from the standpoint of the Internal 
Revenue Code, neither income nor loss has accrued because 
there was no requisite realization.115 
It is apparent from the relevant case law and scholarly dis-
cussion that when exchanging bitcoins for cash, goods, services, 
or other property, as well as when receiving bitcoins for min-
ing, taxable events likely occur. Generally, a transaction that 
alters the relationship of the potential taxpayer to the asset in 
question is required before the imposition of the income tax.116 
The creation of the bitcoins, and their distribution to the indi-
vidual miner, certainly alters the relationship of the miner to 
the coins: it is a payment of sorts for the work done by the tax-
payer’s computer in solving the hash. Even more obvious is the 
exchange of the cryptocurrency for goods, services, or cash. The 
exchange in bitcoins operates nearly identically to that of tradi-
tional money in these types of exchanges, altering the relation-
ships of the parties to the goods or services in question by facil-
itating the transaction. Additionally, the difficulty in establish-
ing a market value for many assets is of little concern to 
Bitcoin users since the currency has an easily ascertainable 
market value. Similarly, the lack of liquidity while holding 
some assets militates against suspending tax payments, but 
since Bitcoin is, or at least is designed to be, a substitute for 
cash payments, that is also not a concern. 
Once it is accepted that bitcoin transactions are taxable 
events, the next issue is how bitcoins should be classified for 
tax purposes. Bitcoin has unique tax implications for both indi-
viduals and corporate entities because the legal identity of a 
bitcoin has not yet been codified or set by legal precedent.117 
                                                                                                                                     
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Nikolei M. Kaplanov, Nerdy Money: Bitcoin, the Private Digital Cur-
rency, and the Case Against Its Regulation, 25 LOYOLA CONSUMER L. REV. 111, 
113 (2012). 
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Bitcoin is dissimilar to anything that existed when current se-
curities regulations and tax laws were written.118 While using 
bitcoins to engage in illegal activity, such as purchasing narcot-
ics or money laundering, does not insulate one from prosecu-
tion, it does provide a level of anonymity comparable to cash 
while expanding the scope of such exchanges to long-distance 
online transactions. Thus, some uses of bitcoin as a payment, 
exchange, or store of wealth operate in a “legal grey area.”119 
Without any case law from which to make a determination as 
to the tax status of Bitcoin,120 tax regulators, planners, and in-
dividuals must compare its various uses to decisions regarding 
more traditional types of economic transactions. While a weak 
argument can be made for exemption from taxation, the three 
realistic options under current tax law are categorization as a 
form of currency, a type of intangible property such as a securi-
ty, or a commodity suitable for barter transactions. 
One comparison drawn between Bitcoin and other digital 
currencies is to that of in-game or virtual world currencies. 
While these game worlds do share some similarities with the 
Bitcoin infrastructure, a comparison to Bitcoin for tax purposes 
may still be unsuitable. Millions of people across the globe par-
ticipate in virtual worlds, some of which have internal econom-
ic systems and currencies.121 Games such as Second Life122 and 
World of Warcraft,123 as well as social networks like Face-
book,124 are a few examples of online forums that provide users 
                                                                                                                                     
 118. Timothy B. Lee, Why Bitcoin Lives in a Legal Gray Area, ARS TECHNICA 
(Aug. 24, 2012, 11:30 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/08/why-
bitcoin-lives-in-a-legal-gray-area/. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Kaplanov, supra note 117, at 113. 
 121. F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 
92 CAL. L. REV. 1, 8 (2004). 
 122. SECOND LIFE, http://www.secondlife.com (last visited Feb. 22, 2014). 
 123. WORLD OF WARCRAFT, http://www.worldofwarcraft.com (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2014). 
 124. Facebook allows users to play games such as FarmVille as part of the 
social network activity. FarmVille allows users to engage in virtual activity 
related to planting and harvesting crops, raising livestock, and cultivating 
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with the opportunity to engage in “economic” activity. This is 
accomplished by exchanging dollars for the internal currency of 
the virtual world, by exchanging with each other within the 
game world, or both.125 Some of the currency exchanges in vir-
tual worlds have little economic significance beyond the initial 
exchange from dollars to in-game currency.126 For some of these 
worlds, the ability to increase a character’s skill, buy game add-
ons, and otherwise enhance the immersive experience is the 
full extent of the transaction.127 Other worlds present the addi-
tional opportunity to earn money in the game via internal ex-
changes and marketplaces that allow for transactions between 
players.128 
Players can create wealth stemming from the game world 
through both in-game and real-world activity.129 They can trade 
with other players within the game environment, exchange vir-
tual items with one another, or swap game items or in-game 
services for in-world currency.130 The income earned from these 
transactions can, in some instances, be “cashed out” or re-
turned to the government-backed currency of the player’s 
choice.131 Players can also engage in “real money trading,” a 
                                                                                                                                     
land. Like many of Facebook’s games, FarmVille is free to play, but users 
have the ability to purchase premium content that enhances the gaming ex-
perience. FarmVille, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/FarmVille (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2014). 
 125. Bryan T. Camp, The Play’s the Thing: A Theory of Taxing Virtual 
Worlds, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 9 (2007). 
 126. Chung, supra note 94, at 776–77. 
 127. Id. at 776. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Camp, supra note 125, at 9. 
 130. Id. 
 131. For example, Blizzard Entertainment’s game Diablo III allows “players 
in certain regions” to link their game account with “an account with an ap-
proved third-party payment service such as PayPal. . . . Once this has been 
completed, proceeds from the sale of items in the real-money auction house 
can be deposited into their third-party payment service account.” Diablo® III 
Auction House—Functionality, BATTLE.NET, 
https://us.battle.net/support/en/article/diablo-iii-auction-house-
functionality#q12 (last visited Jan. 2, 2014). 
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type of transaction involving selling specific virtual items, the 
value of which is typically set by in-game scarcity, or selling 
entire player accounts—again valued by their “level,” “score,” 
or other in-game metric—for government-backed currency.132 
While most of the owners of these virtual worlds frown upon or 
even ban such sales outside the game world, third-party sites 
such as eBay provide an outlet for such transactions.133 
In-game currencies share some similarities with Bitcoin, and 
are likewise not contemplated by the Internal Revenue Code.134 
They can be traded or exchanged for goods, services, or cash, 
and exist only in their digital form; however, unlike in-game 
currencies, Bitcoin was designed for real-world transactions135 
and its production, distribution, and value relative to other 
currencies is not centrally controlled.136 If the entity responsi-
ble for a game like Second Life wishes to inflate or deflate the 
number of Linden Dollars (the game’s internal currency), or 
charge an artificial value for them relative to the U.S. dollar, it 
                                                                                                                                     
 132. Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 121, at 38. 
 133. Id. 
The mechanics of it are simple. Possessing some valuable asset in 
the virtual world . . . I list it for sale in the section of eBay devoted to 
such auctions. The auction winner uses eBay payment mechanisms 
(Visa, Mastercard, PayPal) to transfer the agreed price in the real 
world. I then agree with the auction winner on a meeting place in 
the virtual world, and when we meet there I hand over the in-world 
property. 
Id. 
 134. Leandra Lederman, Ebay’s Second Life: When Should Virtual Earn-
ings Bear Real Taxes?, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 136, 138 (2009). 
 135. While there is no reason to think online game worlds could not accept 
bitcoins for subscription to the game or in-game goods and services, or that 
players could not exchange bitcoins in real-world exchanges related to an 
online world, it is important that Bitcoin was not designed for one of these 
worlds, but instead as a more universal means of commercial exchange. 
 136. Matonis, ECB, supra note 58. 
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may do so.137 Likewise, it can issue currency to players in ex-
change for a monthly fee in U.S. dollars or create its own dollar 
unit subdivisions. Due to the cryptographic design of Bitcoin, 
such manipulation is unlikely.138 
Tantalizing to proponents of Bitcoin is the current silence 
from the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) regarding transac-
tions within a game world. As of now, bitcoins are generally not 
taxable gross income until they are “cashed out” from the in-
game currency back into “real money,” goods, or services.139 
The cash-out rule works well as a de facto rule for virtual 
worlds because it tends to refrain taxing those who benefit only 
in terms of in-game entertainment, while collecting from those 
who acquire real-world benefits.140 If this model were adopted 
and extended to Bitcoin, one could argue that receipt and pay-
ment in bitcoins would not be taxable as income until “cashed 
out” into U.S. dollars or another real-world benefit. Under such 
a system, income tax could potentially be deferred intentionally 
by keeping wealth in the form of bitcoins, perhaps indefinite-
ly.141 
Unfortunately for those eyeing Bitcoin as a cure-all for in-
come taxation, the argument for avoiding taxes by using 
bitcoins falls short in a few important ways. First, while ex-
changes made in bitcoins may take place electronically, they 
are not part of a virtual world, game, or other insulated experi-
ence separate from the marketplace serviced by the cash trans-
action. Thus, the cash-out rule’s primary positive characteris-
tic—protection of gamers from taxation on benefits that do not 
extend into the real world—lacks application to the Bitcoin cli-
ent. Second, realization likely occurs when one receives a 
bitcoin, and in any case, the broad definition of income applied 
                                                                                                                                     
 137. For a look into the real-world legal ramifications of in-game currencies, 
see Kevin W. Saunders, Virtual World—Real Courts, 52 VILL. L. REV. 187 
(2007). 
 138. NAKAMOTO, supra note 16, at 1. 
 139. Chung, supra note 94, at 735. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Lederman, supra note 134, at 138. 
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by the Supreme Court likely rules out any loophole passing ju-
dicial scrutiny.142 In essence, taxation could occur without real-
ization, but legislatures and courts have refused to allow it be-
cause of the difficulties in administering a code that taxes “pa-
per gains.”143 The gains made by receiving bitcoins for services, 
goods, or cash are more aptly compared to cash transactions or 
barter, both of which are taxable events. Finally, technicalities 
such as the cash-out rule have a poor record in U.S. courts. In 
Gregory v. Helvering, the Supreme Court ruled that the legal 
form of a transaction could be ignored in favor of its economic 
substance.144 In so doing, the Court upheld a lower court deci-
sion authored by Judge Learned Hand, who wrote that “the 
meaning of a sentence may be more than that of the separate 
words, as a melody is more than the notes.”145 In short, any le-
gal technicalities regarding the form of Bitcoin or transactions 
in bitcoins are highly unlikely to merit any legal standing for 
the avoidance of income taxation. 
With the cash-out rule inapposite, the threshold issue of 
bitcoin taxation is resolved. While there are three main posi-
tions that the Internal Revenue Service, Congress, or courts 
could adopt with respect to the taxation of Bitcoin transactions, 
each indicates that bitcoins are a type of property that falls 
within the Glenshaw Glass definition of taxable income. First, 
the Internal Revenue Service could determine that bitcoins are 
a security. Alternatively, the IRS could treat Bitcoin as a for-
eign currency. Finally, cryptocurrencies could fall into the cat-
egory of a commodity, making transactions in bitcoin suitable 
for regulation as barter or as part of a barter club. Exactly 
                                                                                                                                     
 142. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 116 (1940). 
 143. For a thorough look at the value of the realization requirement from 
economic and public policy standpoints, see Edward A. Zelinsky, For Realiza-
tion: Income Taxation, Sectoral Accretionism, and the Virtue of Attainable 
Virtues, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 861 (1997). 
 144. Gregory v. Helvering, 55 S.Ct. 266 (1935). 
 145. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810–11 (2d Cir. 1934), aff’d, 293 
U.S. 465 (1935). 
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which of these tax applications will be adopted is unclear,146 
and may in fact differ on a case-by-case basis until such time as 
Congressional legislation, IRS regulation, or a Supreme Court 
decision clarifies the rule. However, since taxable events likely 
occur in a bitcoin transaction, this Note will assume that 
Bitcoin is both legal and taxable in analyzing the cross-border 
tax evasion concerns that follow. 
III. BITCOIN AND THE INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME 
Once the U.S. federal income tax status of a cryptocurrency is 
resolved, the major issue that remains relates to the implica-
tions of the anticipated increase in cash-like transactions 
across borders in bitcoins. Bitcoin, the first digital currency de-
signed to have a real-world, worldwide reach,147 expands the 
field of use for cash-like transactions, creating new problems in 
administrating tax laws across borders. Bitcoin allows for ex-
changes in goods, services, and information on a scale never 
before seen: in effect, a worldwide bazaar where multinational 
corporations and individual vendors have the same access to 
prospective buyers, yet the transactions between them are 
roughly as difficult to investigate as cash exchanges. The pro-
spect of increased tax evasion, and the need to develop infor-
mation-sharing mechanisms among competent authorities,148 
calls for a renewed look at participation in multilateral ap-
proaches to tax enforcement, such as the Convention on Mutual 
Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters. 
                                                                                                                                     
 146. For a thorough discussion of the possible classifications under U.S. 
law, see Grinberg, supra note 75. 
 147. joshritchie, Bitcoins: The Taxless Currency, TAX BREAK: THE TURBOTAX 
BLOG, (July 18, 2011), http://blog.turbotax.intuit.com/2011/07/18/bitcoins-the-
taxless-currency. 
 148. A competent authority for these purposes is a tax administration, such 
as the Internal Revenue Service, that has jurisdiction over enforcing the tax 
code for a state. 
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A. Bitcoin Across Borders 
Bitcoin expands the horizon for “cash-like” transactions from 
face-to-face or mail contacts to the borderless world of the In-
ternet. That includes routine legal purchases, as well as tax 
evasion, money laundering, and illegal purchases of drugs and 
weapons. Among the main criticisms of Bitcoin is its alleged 
use for worldwide criminal activity and as a conduit for tax 
evasion.149 Opponents, such as U.S. Senator Chuck Schumer, 
argue that “it allows buyers and users to sell illegal drugs 
online, including heroin, cocaine, and meth, and users do sell 
by hiding their identities through a program that makes them 
virtually untraceable.”150 The FBI “assesses with medium con-
fidence that, in the near term, cyber criminals will treat Bitcoin 
as another payment option alongside more traditional and es-
tablished virtual currencies.”151 It also foresees that “law en-
forcement faces difficulties in detecting suspicious activity, 
identifying users, and obtaining transaction records—problems 
that might attract malicious actors to Bitcoin.”152 Bitcoin “is 
essentially the cold, hard cash of the Internet,”153 operating in 
much the same way as the aforementioned fiat currencies. 
Thus, major policy concerns arise in accepting into the U.S. tax 
regime a channel for such questionable transactions by poten-
tially anonymous individuals. 
While these criticisms are worthy of consideration, the posi-
tive potential of Bitcoin to encourage efficient economic activi-
                                                                                                                                     
 149. Rosemary Westwood, Why Bitcoin Is the Banking Industry’s Newest, 
Biggest Threat, MACLEAN’S (Jan. 2, 2013 11:58 AM), 
http://www2.macleans.ca/2013/01/02/why-bitcoin-is-the-banking-industrys-
newest-biggest-threat/ (“Bitcoin is known as a choice currency for illegal drug 
websites, money laundering and tax evasion. And that’s among the minority 
of people who are even aware it exists.”). 
 150. Ben Popper, Chuck Schumer Bashes BitCoin, Wants to Shut Down Silk 
Road Drug Site, BETABEAT (June 6, 2011, 11:55 AM), 
http://betabeat.com/2011/06/chuck-schumer-silk-road-bitcoin-drugs. 
 151. FBI REPORT, supra note 34. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Westwood, supra note 149. 
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ty, reduce transaction costs, and promote efficient global trade 
between individuals is worth nurturing.154 Additionally, as the 
European Central Bank noted, 
practically identical problems [to those posed by Bitcoin] can 
also occur when using cash . . . Cash can be used for drug 
dealing and money laundering too; cash can also be stolen, 
not from a digital wallet, but from a physical one; and cash 
can also be used for tax evasion purposes.155 
The Internal Revenue Service estimates that about 17% of to-
tal owed taxes are not paid on time,156 resulting in a difference 
of about US$345 billion in revenue for the U.S. government in 
2001.157 This missing piece of the tax pie is known as the “tax 
gap.”158 Over 80% of the tax gap is attributed to underreport-
ing,159 mostly by individual tax return filers.160 In addition, 
                                                                                                                                     
 154. joshritchie, supra note 147. 
 155. VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES, supra note 82. 
 156. The Tax Gap, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/uac/The-Tax-Gap (last visited 
Oct. 7, 2013). The tax information taken from this article is from 2006. 
 157. Richard B. Malamud & Richard O. Parry, It’s Time to Do Something 
about the Tax Gap, 9 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 1, 11 (2008). 
 158. Eric Toder, What Is the Tax Gap?, TAX NOTES, Oct. 22, 2007, at 1, 
available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1001112_tax_gap.pdf (“The 
gross tax gap is the difference between tax liability in any year and the 
amount of tax that is paid voluntar[ily] and on time.”). 
 159. Id. 
The gross tax gap has three components—non-filing, underreporting 
of tax owed, and underpayment. The three components are mutually 
exclusive and add up to the total tax gap. The non-filing gap is the 
tax not paid on time by taxpayers who have a legal requirement to 
file a tax return, but do not file on time. The underreporting gap is 
the tax owed by taxpayers who file returns on time, but underreport 
the amount of tax they owe. The underpayment gap is the loss of 
revenue owed by taxpayers who file returns on time, but do not pay 
their reported tax due on time. 
Id.; What Is the Tax Gap?, TAX POL’Y CTR., 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/background/tax-gap/what-is.cfm 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2014). Underreporting accounts for about 83% of the 
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“owners of small businesses with substantial cash revenue fail 
to pay about half their taxes,” typically by creating a parallel 
cash economy.161 For example, a small business owner may 
choose to eliminate cash payments under a certain amount 
from the income rolls each day, elect not to deposit that cash, 
and avoid paying both sales and income taxes on those sales.162 
Business owners then spend the cash on inventory, extra pay-
ments to employees, personal property, or simply hoard the 
cash in a safe or deposit box.163 In response, the IRS has gone 
to significant lengths in the food service industry to increase 
compliance among wait staff, as both employees and employers 
tend to underreport cash tips.164 In the Internet context, many 
online auction vendors do not report their sales to the IRS, de-
spite transacting in local currency via online payment facilita-
tor PayPal, or by credit card or personal check.165 These exam-
                                                                                                                                     
gross tax gap, as opposed to underpayment or non-filing, which makes up the 
remainder. Id. 
 160. The Tax Gap, supra note 156. 
 161. Susan Cleary Morse, Stewart Karlinsky & Joseph Bankman, Cash 
Businesses and Tax Evasion, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 37, 43 (2009). 
 162. Id. at 50. 
 163. Id. at 54–55. 
 164. Harold S. Peckron, The Tip Police: Aftermath of the Fior D’italia Rule, 
52 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2002). 
The [Internal Revenue] Service employs an aggregate estimation 
formula. This methodology is based upon an aggregate estimate of 
all tips that the employer’s customers paid to the employees. Using 
this method, the Service merely examines the credit card slips for 
the years in question, determines the customer’s average tip rate, 
assumes that cash customers tipped at the same rate, and then 
simply multiplies this derived tip rate by the employer’s total re-
ceipts. The Service then subtracts the amount already reported from 
the product to determine the [Federal Insurance Contributions Act] 
tax base. 
Id. 
 165. OFFICE OF TAX POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, A COMPREHENSIVE 
STRATEGY FOR REDUCING THE TAX GAP 6 (2006) (“Noncompliance is highest 
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ples illustrate that tax evasion is an inherent problem in a 
cash-based tax system that relies on self-reporting, and is a 
significant problem in online transactions in fiat currency.166 
Therefore, the scope of tax evasion and illegal activity in 
Bitcoin transactions may mirror or even exceed that of tradi-
tional cash transactions, but while Bitcoin may broaden the 
range of transactions that are likely to result in underreport-
ing, the root of the problem exists independent of this technolo-
gy.167 
There are two main tools the U.S. government already has at 
its disposal to curb the potential for money laundering and tax 
evasion as Bitcoin’s popularity grows. The first is that aspects 
of existing laws, most notably the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”), 
likely already encompass transactions in bitcoin.168 The United 
                                                                                                                                     
among taxpayers whose income is not subject to third-party reporting or 
withholding requirements.”). 
 166. Despite the tax gap, T.S. Adams observed that inequitable taxation, of 
which he viewed double taxation as an example, encourages tax evasion. “The 
American taxpayer . . . has been compared, confused, and used synonymously 
with the liar. As a matter of fact, when confronted with an equitable tax and 
a fearless assessor, he is amazingly honest.” Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. 
O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S. International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 
1021, 1033 (1997) (quoting Thomas S. Adams, Interstate and International 
Double Taxation, in LECTURES ON TAXATION 101, 102 (Roswell Magill ed., 
1932)). For a thorough investigation into the challenges and recent develop-
ments involved with e-commerce taxation, including the OECD’s role, see 
generally Arthur J. Cockfield, The Rise of the OECD as Informal “World Tax 
Organization” Through National Responses to E-Commerce Tax Challenges, 8 
YALE J.L. & TECH. 136 (2006). 
 167. Malamud & Parry, supra note 157, at 31. 
Only with voluntary compliance by the American taxpayer can we 
close the tax gap. The IRS needs to be properly funded, and the IRS 
needs to make it known that they are ready, willing and able to lo-
cate, audit and prosecute taxpayers who are not paying their taxes 
in full. This will never be 100% successful, but talking about the 
problem has had little effect. 
Id. 
 168. 31 U.S.C. § 310 (2006); see infra Part III.C; see also Dion, supra note 4. 
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States should strengthen enforcement of those laws and estab-
lish precedent for applying them to digital currencies. The sec-
ond is the increased effectiveness of a combination of bilateral 
tax treaties and the Convention on Mutual Administrative As-
sistance in Tax Matters (“Multilateral Convention” or “Conven-
tion”), each of which can be utilized to increase cooperation be-
tween competent authorities with respect to encouraging dis-
closure of Bitcoin transactions and prosecuting tax evaders. 
B. The International Tax Regime 
One major obstacle to preventing the use of tax shelters and 
tax evasion via underreporting is the limitation on a govern-
ment’s ability to procure timely, relevant information about 
taxpayers.169 Countries simply cannot unilaterally verify tax 
reporting information about the international activity of tax-
payers they suspect of dishonest reporting. The major infor-
mation-gathering apparatus employed to combat this problem 
is contained within the complex network of bilateral income tax 
treaties.170 When citizens and residents of one country regular-
ly earn income in other countries, both the source country 
(where the income was earned) and the residence country 
(where the earner resides) may lay claims to tax the income.171 
Double taxation results when both countries exercise their tax-
ing powers in this manner.172 Double taxation means an earner 
may be taxed on the same income by both the source country 
and the residence country, creating an economically inefficient 
situation.173 One aim of the international tax law regime is re-
solving the competing claims of residence and source nations to 
                                                                                                                                     
 169. Steven A. Dean, The Incomplete Global Market for Tax Information, 49 
B.C. L. REV. 605, 606–07 (2008). 
 170. For a list of U.S. income tax treaties, see United States Income Tax 
Treaties—A to Z, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/International-
Businesses/United-States-Income-Tax-Treaties—-A-to-Z (last visited Feb. 22, 
2014). 
 171. Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 166, at 1033. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
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avoid double taxation.174 The primary method for coordinating 
tax policies is a bilateral treaty on taxation signed between two 
countries. There are over seventeen hundred bilateral tax trea-
ties currently in effect.175 
In addition to eliminating double taxation, such treaties also 
promote information sharing between signatories. “Bilateral 
information exchange provisions allow two governments to bar-
ter with one another, each supplying information that the other 
can use to enforce its taxes.”176 The two countries create a sys-
tem in which one agrees to send lists of taxpayer-specific in-
formation to the other country, which in return provides simi-
lar lists.177 The countries are not typically able to buy or trade 
anything other than tax information in return for the tax in-
formation received, so they cannot usually pay cash in consid-
eration for the information.178 
While bilateral arrangements have proven stable and popu-
lar, they suffer from considerable limitations. For example, a 
bilateral arrangement is limited, for the most part, to its two 
signatories; however, multinational corporations operate in 
many countries. As a result, the corporations may engage in 
tax planning intended to “go beyond eliminating double taxa-
tion and to reduce tax to a minimum.”179 There are also more 
complicated arrangements made common by electronic curren-
                                                                                                                                     
 174. Id. 
 175. Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, 
Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1357, 
1377 (2001). 
 176. Dean, supra note 169, at 608. The U.S. Model Income Tax Convention 
requires “such information as may be relevant for carrying out the provisions 
of this Convention or of the domestic laws of [that country] concerning taxes 
of every kind imposed by [that country] to the extent that the taxation there-
under is not contrary to the Convention.” U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, 
Nov. 15, 2006, art. 26(1), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Documents/hp16801.pdf. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Victor Thuronyi, International Tax Cooperation and a Multilateral 
Treaty, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1641, 1651 (2001). 
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cies that bilateral agreements do not contemplate, or can han-
dle only with great difficulty. For example, suppose that a tax-
payer is a resident in State A, but has a bitcoin mining opera-
tion in State B, which pays a percentage of its mining rewards 
to miners in several states. The resident of State A could poten-
tially also buy and sell widgets in bitcoin to residents of State 
C, perhaps even employing a resident of State D to build the 
widgets. It may be possible for each of these states to have suf-
ficient bilateral arrangements such that all relevant tax infor-
mation can be shared, but if any state involved is not a party to 
a bilateral arrangement with one or more of the other states, it 
could hinder the gathering of relevant information. The rela-
tive anonymity of bitcoin transactions provides an additional 
layer of mystery should a prospective taxpayer or resident 
choose not to disclose certain transactions. “Taxing authorities 
are perplexed over which country should have taxation rights 
in complex international electronic transactions,”180 and the 
prospect of increased anonymity and lack of a paper trail facili-
tated by Bitcoin exacerbates that confusion. 
Under a network of several bilateral treaties, universal cov-
erage is almost impossible to achieve because each agreement 
requires significant time to negotiate, ratify, and, when major 
changes are required, amend. Smaller countries, including 
many of those considered tax havens,181 may not have the re-
sources necessary to create a patchwork of tax treaties, and 
                                                                                                                                     
 180. Kyrie E. Thorpe, International Taxation of Electronic Commerce: Is the 
Internet Age Rendering the Concept of Permanent Establishment Obsolete?, 11 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 633, 634 (1997). 
 181. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(“OECD”) uses four factors to determine whether a jurisdiction is a  
tax haven: “1) No or nominal tax on the relevant income;  
2) Lack of effective exchange of information; 3) Lack of transparency; 4) No su
bstantial activities. No or nominal tax is not sufficient in itself to classify  
a country as a tax haven.” COUNTERING OFFSHORE TAX EVASION: SOME 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE PROJECT, OECD CTR. FOR TAX POL’Y & 
ADMIN. (Sept. 28, 2009), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-
information/42469606.pdf. 
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may determine that their limited resources are better used 
elsewhere.182 Thus, “[o]nly under a multilateral treaty could 
the majority of developing countries hope to enter into an ex-
tensive tax treaty network. The current regime, therefore, ef-
fectively precludes countries with smaller economies from fully 
participating in the treaty network.”183 Without full participa-
tion by all the countries involved, incomplete information, trea-
ty shopping, and delayed reactions to significant technological, 
political, or economic changes are inevitable. 
While multilateral cooperation seems to be a mutually bene-
ficial goal for nations interested in increasing tax efficiency, 
and thus economic efficiency, ceding sovereign rights to an in-
ternational organization or agency seems a step too far for most 
states. Professor Michael Graetz notes that economic efficiency 
plays an important role in formulating policy, but “[a]s with 
domestic tax policy, the proper question is about the effects of 
international tax rules on the economic well-being, [and] wel-
fare, of U.S. citizens and residents.”184 Ceding tax authority to 
an international body “would require a degree of international 
tax cooperation that may charitably be described as implausi-
ble,”185 chiefly because “[m]ost nations continue to view their 
tax systems as an important component in pursuing socio-
economic policies and wish to maintain laws and policies tai-
lored to their national interest.”186 Since governments generally 
assert a need to protect their tax sovereignty, the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”), “which 
emphasizes multilateral deliberation and consensus-building 
through ‘soft institutions,’ may be the best available option” for 
                                                                                                                                     
 182. Thuronyi, supra note 179, at 1656. 
 183. Id. at 1656. 
 184. Graetz, supra note 175. 
 185. Walter Hellerstein, Jurisdiction to Tax Income and Consumption in the 
New Economy: A Theoretical and Comparative Perspective, 38 GA. L. REV. 1, 
45 (2003). 
 186. Cockfield, supra note 166. 
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nations to improve cooperation and information-sharing tech-
niques while maintaining control over tax policy.187 
C. The Bank Secrecy Act 
Congress passed the Bank Secrecy Act in 1970.188 It was the 
first set of laws designed to combat money laundering in the 
United States.189 The BSA requires certain businesses to main-
tain records and report information that has “a high degree of 
usefulness in criminal, tax, and regulatory matters.”190 The re-
port filings are used by domestic and international law en-
forcement agencies “to identify, detect and deter money laun-
dering whether it is in furtherance of a criminal enterprise, 
terrorism, tax evasion or other unlawful activity.”191 
In July 2011, the BSA’s definition of a “money transmission 
service” was amended to include “the acceptance of currency, 
funds, or other value that substitutes for currency from one 
person and the transmission of currency, funds or other value 
to another location or person by any means.”192 The BSA’s defi-
nition likely qualifies most third-party Bitcoin services as mon-
ey service businesses (“MSB”), requiring them to register with 
the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), the 
U.S. Treasury Department’s agency to combat money launder-
ing. It also subjects them to examination for compliance with 
the BSA by the Internal Revenue Service.193 
Under the BSA, a U.S. citizen, resident, or other person with 
a financial interest in one or more foreign financial accounts 
must file a Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts 
(“FBAR”) if “the aggregate value of the foreign financial ac-
                                                                                                                                     
 187. Id. 
 188. Peter E. Meltzer, Keeping Drug Money from Reaching the Wash Cycle: 
A Guide to the Bank Secrecy Act, 108 BANKING L.J. 230 (1991). 
 189. Id. 
 190. 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (2006). 
 191. Bank Secrecy Act Regulations; Definitions and Other Regulations Re-
lating to Money Services Businesses, 31 C.F.R. § 1010 (2011). 
 192. FBI REPORT, supra note 34. 
 193. 31 C.F.R. § 1010. 
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counts exceeds [US]$10,000 at any time during the calendar 
year.”194 For the purposes of this report, a financial account in-
cludes a “securities, brokerage, savings, demand, checking, de-
posit, time deposit, or other account maintained with a finan-
cial institution (or other person performing the services of a 
financial institution).”195 The BSA defines the term ‘‘financial 
institution’’ to include, inter alia, a currency exchange; a person 
who engages as a business in the transmission of funds; and 
“any business or agency which engages in any activity” deter-
mined by regulation to be “an activity similar to, related to, or 
a substitute for these activities.”196 Under this definition, U.S. 
citizens holding bitcoins in foreign accounts in amounts over 
US$10,000 are required to file FBAR reports.197 
Bitcoin proponents tout anonymity and privacy as important 
reasons for the Bitcoin client’s creation, but whether the pro-
gram is truly anonymous, or even private, is subject to debate. 
Bitcoin’s method of clearing payments—the peer-to-peer hash-
ing that eliminates the need for third parties—is open to the 
public; that is, every transaction on the Bitcoin network is 
available for inspection by users, the public, and tax authori-
ties.198 There is no central database in which to find the own-
ers—or even the wallets—attached to Bitcoin addresses; how-
ever, since the records of every transaction are public, 
“[o]fficials trying to identify a particular address will have a 
complete record of every address that’s ever sent money to, or 
received money from, that address.”199 If those transacting ad-
                                                                                                                                     
 194. Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR), IRS, 
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Report-of-
Foreign-Bank-and-Financial-Accounts-FBAR (last visited Dec. 30, 2013). 
 195. Id. 
 196. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5312(a)(2)(J), (R), (Y) (2006). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Blockexplorer.com, for example, allows any party to easily search the 
“blocks, addresses and transactions created by Bitcoin.” BITCOIN BLOCK 
EXPLORER, http://blockexplorer.com/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2013). 
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dresses are within the jurisdiction of the authority, authorities 
can compel Internet providers and other businesses to “disclose 
details (IP addresses, shipping addresses, contact email ad-
dress, etc.) that could help identify the address’s owner.”200 
While the information obtained in this fashion may be incom-
plete, it would provide relevant authorities with significant in-
formation with which to conduct “basic detective work,” espe-
cially with respect to casual users of the Bitcoin client.201 Simi-
larly, the FBI concluded that “law enforcement can discover 
more information about, and in some cases identify, malicious 
actors, if the actors convert their bitcoins into a fiat curren-
cy.”202 
Despite the confines of online anonymity, Bitcoin allows a us-
er to create an unlimited number of addresses from which one 
can send or receive coins, and it is “standard practice to use a 
new address for each incoming payment. This way, there’s no 
link between different inbound transactions.”203 As automated 
transactions on the system become more prominent, sophisti-
cated users will have the ability to increase the anonymity of 
their transactions and even provide comprehensive money 
laundering services.204 The money laundering strategies “could 
probably be used with traditional currencies too,” but Bitcoin 
makes automation of such illegal activity easier so that “users 
don’t have to understand every detail of the interactions to use 
the system effectively.”205 However, at least one study has con-
cluded that “it is possible to associate many public-keys with 
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each other, and with external identifying information,” and 
that “large centralized services such as the exchanges and wal-
let services are capable of identifying and tracking considerable 
portions of user activity.”206 While time and technology will tell 
whether money laundering becomes an attractive prospect for 
Bitcoin users, one wishing to transact primarily in bitcoins will 
still need to buy tangible goods or exchange the bitcoins for lo-
cal currency, each of which provides opportunities for relevant 
authorities to gather information about the purchaser.207 
Taking the FBAR requirement for individuals and FinCEN 
registration for MSB together, U.S. law already regulates for 
most major transactions in bitcoin. What remains is to facili-
tate the enforcement of these laws on the expanded field of use 
on which Bitcoin operates. Currently, the exchange of infor-
mation regarding tax evasion among nations “is sporadic, diffi-
cult, and unwieldy for tax administrators even under the best 
of circumstances. When a banking haven is the requested par-
ty, information exchange is nearly impossible.”208 Developing 
countries tend to avoid bilateral agreements as well, perhaps 
because of their lack of leverage with developed nations, caus-
ing a gap in information exchange between perceived tax ha-
vens and developed countries.209 
D. The Multilateral Convention 
There is one international agreement, to which the United 
States is a party, which aims to increase cooperation and com-
pliance with respect to tracking tax evaders without requiring 
signatories to yield significant sovereignty rights over tax poli-
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cy. The Multilateral Convention covers all information needed 
for assessing and collecting taxes from both companies and in-
dividuals.210 It has been signed by over forty countries, though 
it is only enforced by just over twenty.211 In light of the in-
creased difficulty in tracking tax evaders over the Internet, and 
the rapidly developing technology of Bitcoin and other electron-
ic currencies, the United States should promote the Multilat-
eral Convention as a method to increase the ability of its tax 
authorities to investigate tax evasion via Bitcoin. 
The Multilateral Convention was created by the Council of 
Europe and the OECD.212 It requires that contracting states 
provide administrative assistance in tax matters, namely, by 
providing exchange of information, assistance in recovery, and 
service of documents.213 Exchange of information, the only 
compulsory aspect for signatories of the Convention, obliges 
contracting parties to provide information “foreseeably relevant 
for the administration or enforcement of . . . domestic laws con-
cerning the taxes covered by [the] Convention.”214 Assistance in 
recovery requires that, unless a state enters a “reservation,” it 
must use its domestic enforcement powers to help collect taxes 
owed to another state.215 In short, unless a signatory has de-
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clared that they will not do so in advance, “the requested state 
must recover tax claims of another state against its own na-
tionals.”216 Finally, service of documents requires that the re-
quested state serve an addressee with documents related to a 
tax covered by the Convention.217 
While the United States has cautiously elected not to enforce 
certain provisions of the Convention, it is the exchange of in-
formation provision, which it has agreed to implement, that is 
the most useful in piecing together information regarding illicit 
transactions and tax evasion in bitcoins. The IRS website lists 
over sixty income tax treaties,218 more than the number of sig-
natories to the Convention. But the Multilateral Convention 
has additional benefits, such as expanding “the class of persons 
that may be the subjects of administrative assistance” and 
providing in greater detail the types of information that must 
be exchanged for tax enforcement purposes, as well as the rules 
regarding the exchange of that information.219 
Where most bilateral agreements vaguely provide for the 
voluntary exchange of information upon request, “the Multilat-
eral [Convention] specifically provides for five types of infor-
mation exchange, including the three types—exchange on re-
quest, routinely, or spontaneously—generally provided for in 
bilateral double taxation treaties and two optional types.”220 
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The efficacy of these exchanges is increased in the Convention 
because they allow, within the limits of domestic law, “a treaty 
partner to employ administrative process on behalf of the oth-
er,”221 and expand the individuals who can be investigated to 
include more parties.222 Even more important, the Convention 
allows for information sharing with third-party nations if per-
mitted by the original requesting state, an advanced level of 
collaboration not contemplated in bilateral agreements.223 The 
information-sharing provision turns bilateral cooperation into 
multinational efforts without requiring an intricate web of 
treaties. 
The two types of information exchange that are not typically 
included in bilateral agreements are simultaneous tax exami-
nation and tax examination abroad.224 A simultaneous tax ex-
amination “is an arrangement by two or more countries to ex-
amine simultaneously and independently, each on its territory, 
the tax affairs of taxpayers (or a taxpayer) in which they have a 
common or related interest with a view to exchanging any rele-
vant information.”225 Through simultaneous examinations, au-
thorities in multiple jurisdictions are able to share information 
where “international tax avoidance and evasion is suspect-
                                                                                                                                     
 221. Id. at 81. 
 222. Id. at 76. 
 223. Id. at 63. 
Assume that the French government spontaneously transmits to the 
United States information indicating that a Swedish citizen and res-
ident understated United States income tax liability. Receipt of that 
information causes the United States to suspect the possibility of 
understatement of income in Spain, Norway, and Denmark. On se-
curing the permission of the French government, the United States 
may share the information with Spain, Norway, and Denmark. 
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ed.”226 They can also work together to avoid duplicating tax 
evasion proceedings and double taxation on suspected tax 
evaders.227 
Similarly, the tax examination abroad procedure “operates by 
enabling tax administrations, when requested and to the ex-
tent allowable by its domestic law, to permit authorised tax of-
ficials of another country to participate in the conduct of tax 
examinations carried out by the requested country.”228 The pro-
cess may involve passive cooperation, meaning that foreign of-
ficials may be limited to observation of interviews and liaising 
only with delegated officials, but foreign officials may also take 
a more active role in the investigations if domestic law al-
lows.229 Notably, the tax examination abroad provision could 
allow “the requested country to retain full control of the [inves-
tigative] process yet be freed from the cost and resource impli-
cations that it may otherwise face.”230 This would provide the 
United States with an opportunity to pursue those suspected of 
evading U.S. taxes across international borders with the coop-
eration of states that may not otherwise have the means to en-
force stringent laws. The Convention will likely serve as a more 
effective compliance tool than a bilateral agreement because its 
specificity and strong language in tax administration, in com-
parison with that of a bilateral agreement, allow for a more 
comprehensive view of the relevant activities.231 The U.S. gov-
ernment should focus on bringing the Multilateral Convention 
into force to reap the benefits of the Convention, which include 
allaying many of the concerns over the use of electronic curren-
cies like Bitcoin. 
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CONCLUSION 
Bitcoin is a novel invention. It combines decentralized bank-
ing with the boundless marketplace that thrives on the Inter-
net, while preserving significant privacy for its users. It allows 
for cash-like transactions between individuals with no inter-
mediaries and without a political entity able to manipulate the 
money supply. It also has no exact parallel in tax law, which 
means that its status for income tax purposes is murky, and its 
potential for causing confusion in the enforcement of interna-
tional tax laws grows exponentially with the open-source pro-
ject’s popularity. Still, the United States is well equipped to 
encapsulate Bitcoin into its tax regime should it wish to do so. 
The Bank Secrecy Act and the enforcement powers of the IRS 
already cover tax evasion, including most types of schemes in-
volving bitcoins. The Bitcoin infrastructure may make tax eva-
sion easier by putting it on a worldwide stage, and thus it may 
be more expensive for authorities to track down illegal activity, 
but law-abiding users of Bitcoin will see real benefits from the 
use of the electronic currency. The Convention on Mutual Ad-
ministrative Assistance in Tax Matters can be a valuable tool 
for states to pool information and resources, thus eliminating 
some of those increased administrative costs. By acting early in 
Bitcoin’s development, authorities can set precedent for future 
users to follow and become leaders in the facilitation of 
Bitcoin’s legal use as an apolitical worldwide system of com-
merce. 
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